The thing missing was that with new rocket designs you expect some booms, but you take that data and you find out why so the next boom isnāt from the same thing. Which in the case of anything theyāve touched in the FAA or other places, is not whatās happening. Itās a free for all sponsored by the prevailing administration. There was not a goal to fix and improve, but to make a show of it (at a minimum, Iām sure conspiracies abound on the real purposes).
I often see SpaceX as a separate thing from Musk, mainly because heās been smart enough to let them run themselves more than the other companies. And it shows.
You actually want to do component-level testing instead of an all-up, so theoretically you find the thing that makes it go boom without it going boom.
Failure to Launch is doing a large multi-part on how NASA insisting on doing all-ups with the shuttle (because itās easier to explain to media and budget dudes than component testing) was part of what led to Challenger happening. The issue with an all-up in rocketry without the component testing before means that when something goes boom, youāre now doing a huge deep dive on production data from subcontractors of subcontractors of contractors, and whatever you can piece together from the exploded components.
Good points, full building to fill isnāt great, but the assumption is that heavy testing is done before that point, so the failure isnāt a known one, but to learn a new factor to design for. The advantage now is the data retrieval, everything has a sensor or camera so itās far easier (still difficult) to find the cause. Whereas a big part of the Challenger aftermath was going off of media footage to find the spot that led to looking closer at the o-rings. There is also the issue that some were already telling them to not launch, but that was quieted down because of the focus and they didnāt want to drag it out more (without looking, it had been delayed a few times I think). So that was more a production run that pushed past recommended limits.
Thereās always pressure to ship! And itās not like thereās a sudden cutoff between safe and not safe, nor was the o-ring failure an expected scenario. Do you really hold a critical launch because someone is being paranoid about temperature?
Being somewhat facetious with that but itās easy to see how the wrong decision was made and I know in would not have done better
With the shuttle, you had less than half a dozen ships, all hand built. Component testing would not have been as likely
The SpaceeX approach is all about āmass productionā. Everything is componentized, everything is made to scale. They can easily component test an engine, for example, because there are always more and it is somewhat independent of the ship
The thing missing was that with new rocket designs you expect some booms, but you take that data and you find out why so the next boom isnāt from the same thing. Which in the case of anything theyāve touched in the FAA or other places, is not whatās happening. Itās a free for all sponsored by the prevailing administration. There was not a goal to fix and improve, but to make a show of it (at a minimum, Iām sure conspiracies abound on the real purposes).
I often see SpaceX as a separate thing from Musk, mainly because heās been smart enough to let them run themselves more than the other companies. And it shows.
You actually want to do component-level testing instead of an all-up, so theoretically you find the thing that makes it go boom without it going boom.
Failure to Launch is doing a large multi-part on how NASA insisting on doing all-ups with the shuttle (because itās easier to explain to media and budget dudes than component testing) was part of what led to Challenger happening. The issue with an all-up in rocketry without the component testing before means that when something goes boom, youāre now doing a huge deep dive on production data from subcontractors of subcontractors of contractors, and whatever you can piece together from the exploded components.
Good points, full building to fill isnāt great, but the assumption is that heavy testing is done before that point, so the failure isnāt a known one, but to learn a new factor to design for. The advantage now is the data retrieval, everything has a sensor or camera so itās far easier (still difficult) to find the cause. Whereas a big part of the Challenger aftermath was going off of media footage to find the spot that led to looking closer at the o-rings. There is also the issue that some were already telling them to not launch, but that was quieted down because of the focus and they didnāt want to drag it out more (without looking, it had been delayed a few times I think). So that was more a production run that pushed past recommended limits.
Thereās always pressure to ship! And itās not like thereās a sudden cutoff between safe and not safe, nor was the o-ring failure an expected scenario. Do you really hold a critical launch because someone is being paranoid about temperature?
Being somewhat facetious with that but itās easy to see how the wrong decision was made and I know in would not have done better
With the shuttle, you had less than half a dozen ships, all hand built. Component testing would not have been as likely
The SpaceeX approach is all about āmass productionā. Everything is componentized, everything is made to scale. They can easily component test an engine, for example, because there are always more and it is somewhat independent of the ship