
One interesting fact about padding oracle attacks (the family of attacks to which poodle belongs) is that they only work on CBC-mode block ciphers. CTR-mode, an alternative mode of operation that essentially changes a block cipher to a stream cipher, cannot be vulnerable to this kind of attack (and has the added benefit of being easily parallelizable), but has suffered from a lack of adaption due to some misunderstandings. As @journeysquid noted, OpenSSH has now actually disabled CBC ciphers in general, which is probably a good idea.
Note: You probably shouldn’t actually use CTR mode for anything, is it doesn’t provide authentication, but in a situation where you’re choosing between CTR and CBC, choose CTR
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With regard to the changelog, saying CBC ciphers are unsafe is pretty misleading. CBC implemented properly is rock-solid (against a certain subset of attacks with for a certain definition of rock-solid that does include an epsilon term for attacker advantage). It’s just slower and easy to mess up in certain ways (although CTR and CTR-based modes in general are far from foolproof, for instance, reusing a nonce compromising the whole plaintext, instead of just metadata)
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