We give developers powerful APIs to build incredible capabilities into their apps for Apple products, backed by a set of controls designed to protect users’ private data. Full Disk Access largely sidesteps these controls in order to allow backup apps to function properly on the Mac. Some developers are using Full Disk Access in ways that could put users at risk, exposing everything on their systems—including files, mail, messages, and even browsing history—without users’ full knowledge and understanding. For communication apps, this can also compromise the privacy of the people users are communicating with.Going forward, we will introduce additional controls to ensure that users who genuinely wish to grant an app this extraordinary level of access can only do so with very explicit user action. Addressing this is critical. As AI agents become increasingly capable and autonomous, the risks associated with this level of access will grow substantially. We are committed to ensuring users clearly understand these risks before granting such access, so they can make informed decisions about their own data and privacy.
Looking at this MacBook Pro, only a handful of apps to which I’ve granted Full Disk Access are backup apps. Others include the Finder replacement Bloom, launchers like Alfred, the wonderful selection utility PopClip, Apple’s own Pixelmator Pro, Setapp, TestFlight, Unread, Supercharge, Madden NFL 27 Arcade Edition, Hazel, and many others.
Half of the apps on this list have no reason whatsoever to be granted full disk access, and should not have it. If anything, this change might encourage developers to limit their products to only the access they actually need.
I found this quote from the MacStories post on the matter interesting:
Half of the apps on this list have no reason whatsoever to be granted full disk access, and should not have it. If anything, this change might encourage developers to limit their products to only the access they actually need.
score 1 · canonical