You should look up who runs the .com and .net registries, and who therefore controls the DNSSEC signing keys for those zones. DNSSEC signing keys which can be silently misused and undetectably selectively served to targeted clients, because DNSSEC has no equivalent of Certificate Transparency.
It’s better because I can choose a different TLD whose operators I trust. With the PKI, it doesn’t matter which CA I pick because all other CAs are still able to emit valid certificates for my domain.
DNSSEC has no equivalent of Certificate Transparency.
One can totally combine DNSSEC with CT. I didn’t suggest that DNSSEC/TLSA should fully replace all the existing checks browsers perform.
You should look up who runs the
.comand.netregistries, and who therefore controls the DNSSEC signing keys for those zones. DNSSEC signing keys which can be silently misused and undetectably selectively served to targeted clients, because DNSSEC has no equivalent of Certificate Transparency.How is this better?
score 1 · canonical
It’s better because I can choose a different TLD whose operators I trust. With the PKI, it doesn’t matter which CA I pick because all other CAs are still able to emit valid certificates for my domain.
One can totally combine DNSSEC with CT. I didn’t suggest that DNSSEC/TLSA should fully replace all the existing checks browsers perform.
score 1 · canonical