• There was a similar case — generalising from Debian OpenSSL incident seems to be not too hard for an entity with no issues spending energy on out-there checks just in case.

    Of course, Debian incident was still using a PRNG on top of weak initialisation, but there were RSA keys so non-coprime distinct public keys were a giveaway.

    I think some of the generic attack algorithms are slow but fast in the extreme cases (like here)? So running them with a timeout is a reasonable generalisation of «there are some weirdly weak keys around»


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    • That’s a good point. I’m well aware of this issue but OTOH it was 15 years ago and I din’t have it around in my mind; I had it not long ago while maintaining the openssl ubuntu package (as not to do the same) but not anymore once being from a different context. This could be enough that the first rationale step becomes to bruteforce a bunch of values even though it’s not a perfect match as the range of private keys didn’t start at 0 but at some time shifted by some amount.


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